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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MARK KING
Applicant/Petitioner
*

v.
BOARD OF REVIEW of the
Industrial Commission of Utah;
SUPERIOR ROOFING COMPANY, INC.
and,
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF
UTAH,

*

Priority No. 7

*

Case No. 920464-CA

*
*
*
*
*
*

Defendant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter under Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 (2), 35-1-86 and 63-46b-16.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether the Petitioner is entitled to additional compensation
for temporary total disability because of his incarceration after
his accident which delayed necessary surgical treatment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Intermediate standard of reasonableness and rationality with
appropriate deference to the decision of the administrative agency
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §63-46b-16 (4). Pro Benefit Staffing,
Inc. v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Grace
Drilling v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. of App. 1989).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUES
The applicable versions of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65:
35-1-65 Temporary disability (1) In case of temporary
disability, the employee shall receive sixty-six and twothirds percent of that employees1 weekly wages at the
time of injury so long as such disability is total, but
not more than a maximum of 100 percent of the State
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week,
and not less than a minimum of $45.00 per week plus $5.00
for a dependant spouse and $5.00 for each dependant child
under the age of the eighteen years, up to a maximum of
four such dependant children, not to exceed the average
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury,
but not to exceed 100 percent of the State average weekly
wage at the time of the injury per week.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
Review

Nature of the Case.
of

an

Administrative

Industrial

This case involves a Petition for
Commission

Order

Law Judge's denial of a claim

affirming

the

for protracted

temporary total disability benefits because of the Petitioner's
incarceration.
B.

Course of proceedings below. Petitioner suffered an on-

the-job injury to his wrist for which he has been fully compensated
under the Workers1 Compensation Act except for the period of time
between his incarceration at the Utah State Prison on May 22, 1990
and his surgery on January 30, 1991. The applicant was scheduled
for surgery prior to his incarceration. The surgery was postponed
because of his incarceration.

Following his release from prison,

the surgery was rescheduled and temporary total disability benefits
were paid following surgery during the period of recovery.
Petitioner

sought

additional

temporary

total

compensation from May 22, 1990 to January 29, 1991.
-2-

disability

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Applicant's claim for
the additional period of time and the Order was affirmed by the
Industrial Commission on June 24, 1992. (R. 57).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Petitioner suffered an on-the-job injury to his wrist on

or about November 20, 1989. (R. 3, 11).
2.

The

Petitioner

received

temporary

total

disability

benefits from the Workers Compensation Fund from November 21, 1989
through May 22, 1990, and again from January 29, 1991 through July
14, 1991 in the sum of $7,963.68 at which time Petitioner returned
to work. (R. 3, 11, 12).
3.

The Petitioner was scheduled for surgery on May 30, 1990

but was not performed because Petitioner was incarcerated on May
22, 1990 for a parole violation. (R. 11).
4.

The Petitioner was released from prison on October 13,

1990, and surgery was eventually performed on January 30, 1991.
(R. 11).
5.

Petitioner claims additional temporary total disability

compensation during the period of his incarceration from May 22,
1990 through October 13, 1990, and for the period from October 14,
1990 until his surgery on January 30, 1991. (R. 43).
6.

Petitioner's

claim

for

additional

temporary

total

disability benefits was denied by the Administrative Law Judge.
The Order of Denial was affirmed by the Commission sitting en banc
from which Order this appeal was taken. (R. 12, 13, 57)•

-3-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
An injured worker is not entitled to protracted temporary
total

disability

benefits

when

surgery

is

delayed

due

to

circumstances over which the insurance carrier has no control.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
An injured worker cannot unilaterally extend a
period of temporary total disability for nonmedical reasons unrelated to the industrial
accident and over which the insurance carrier
has no control.
The determination of temporary total disability is a medical
determination.

Stabilization is strictly a medical question that

is appropriately decided on the basis of medical evidence.

Booms

v. Rapp Construction Companyf 720 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986).
If the applicant had undergone surgery on May 30, 1990 as
scheduled, he would have received all compensation due him in due
course. He now seeks, however, to extend his entitlement by nearly
eight months because of his incarceration and unavailability of
medical care, circumstances over which the Defendants had no
control whatsoever. It is uncontroverted that all medical expenses
and compensation have been paid except for the interim period in
question.
In his Order of July 9, 1991, the Administrative Law Judge
reasoned that, "To allow the Applicant to receive temporary total
disability while he was incarcerated, would in effect be saying
-4-

that the Applicant, for whatever reason, may prolong the receipt of
definitive surgical treatment, for whatever reason, and the carrier
will be required to pay benefits during that prolonged period.
Such a result is clearly not mandated by the Workers1 Compensation
Act, nor by common sense or reason.11 (R. 12).
Although

not

precisely

in

point,

the

decision

of

the

Administrative Law Judge is supported by the case of Griffith v.
Industrial Commission, 754 P. 2d 981, in which the Utah Court of
Appeals was confronted with a similar issue in which surgery was
delayed due to reasons unrelated to the industrial accident.

In

the Griffith Case, the Applicant required surgery, but an internist
evaluated his hypertension and asthma and advised that his ankle
surgery should be postponed until the hypertension and asthma were
controlled.

The

Administrative

Law

Judge

determined

that

Defendants should not be liable for the period of time which
Plaintifffs hypertension and asthma had to be stabilized so as to
allow surgery to be safely performed.
We are not here confronted with whether or not an injured
worker

can continue to receive compensation

benefits

industrial accident during a period of incarceration.

for an

Here, the

issue is whether the insurance carrier can be held liable for an
additional eight months of temporary total disability caused by a
delay in obtaining surgery, a circumstance over which it had no
control.

In the instant case, the surgery was delayed because of

the applicant's incarceration and because his treating physician
was called up in the Desert Storm operation. Had the surgery taken
-5-

place as scheduled, there would have been no claim for additional
compensation.

Here,

the

delay

was

due

to

Petitioner's

incarceration, but it could have been due to any number of reasons.
The Petitioner could have developed anxiety about the scheduled
surgery and refused surgery on the date scheduled.
would have been the same.
that

the

Fund's

The result

Surely it can not logically be argued

liability

can

be

extended

by

circumstances

unrelated to the industrial accident.
Applicant claims that he has been denied a full and fair
hearing in this matter because no testimony was taken with respect
to

the

reasons

incarceration.

for

his

parole

violation

resulting

These reasons are wholly immaterial.

in

his

A hearing

would provide no additional probative information relative to the
issue at hand.

The original Order of the Administrative Law Judge

was remanded by the Industrial Commission for the purpose of
obtaining information relative to the date he was released from
jail.

In the Order Upon Remand entered by the Administrative Law

Judge on March 20, 1992, he specifically noted the Applicant's
incarceration was from May 22, 1990 through October 13, 1990 but he
found no causal connection between the claimed period of disability
and the industrial accident.

Rather, he found the claimed period

of disability was causally related to his incarceration and not to
the industrial accident.
In its second review of this matter, the Industrial Commission
noted the Administrative Law Judge's statement that, "Had the
Applicant

not been

incarcerated, he would have received the
-6-

scheduled

surgery,

and would

not have

temporary disability that he did.*1

incurred

a period of

The Commission noted that the

Applicant had received the amount of temporary disability that he
would have received had he not been incarcerated and there was no
justification for extending the period for which the carrier was
liable because of a period of incarceration or for any other reason
over which the carrier had no control. (R. 57).
POINT II
The Petitioner's argument that he was punished
due to the unavailability of medical treatment
is without merit.
Petitioner seeks to impute all of the circumstances leading to
his incarceration and all of the difficulties he encountered while
incarcerated to the Workers Compensation Fund.
nothing

to do with

the delay

The Fund had

in the accomplishment

of the

Applicant1 s surgery. A claim that he was punished is groundless.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner's argument that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act
does not empower the Industrial

Commission to withhold workers'

compensation benefits from incarcerated claimants misstates the
issue in this case.

By arguing that the Act is not a fault based

system also misstates the issue in this case.
additional

benefits

claimed

was not

incarceration or upon his fault.

based

The denial of the
upon

Petitioner's

The denial was based upon the

fact that the conditions and circumstances causing the delay in
surgery were conditions and circumstances over which the Fund had
-7-

no control and it would be manifestly unfair to causally attribute
such an extended period of time to the industrial accident. Fault
is immaterial except as to the circumstances relative to the
industrial accident itself.

Fault on the part of the Petitioner

regarding other matters is an entirely different matter. Here€ the
Commission correctly concluded the Fund's liability for additional
compensation could not be extended by the actions of others over
whom the Fund had no control.
WHEREFORE, Respondents move this Court for an Order denying
the Petitioner's appeal and affirming the Order of the Industrial
Commission.
DATED this

JL *4

day of November, 1992,

Ridhard G. Sumsion
Attorney for Respondents,
Superior Roofing Company and
Workers Compensation Fund
of Utah

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify I mailed four copies of thss foregoing Brief of
Respondents to:
Robert Breeze
211 East Broadway #215
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this

pL V

Benjamin J. Sims
Industrial Coittmission of \3tah
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

day of November, 1992.

^//*lt*^™^

,
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< ,

—

—

Attorney for Respondents
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ADDENDUM

Order dated July 9t 199 I
Order tor Remand dated Oetobpi:: ] 7, 111 9 93
Oiniei Upon Remand da Loci March 20, ] 992
Denial of Motion for Review (MFR Denial,
Section 35-1-65

.• •
> .^ „ ^

n e Amtf

±j?&

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case NO. 91000307

??- % /T/~

MARK KING,

?

&

Appl, i rant
ORDER
vs.
SUPERIOR ROOFING COMPANY and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH,'
Defendants.
„

„

„

„

„

„

„

„

-

-

-

*

*

*

*

*

~

This case x;;verves an issue of first impression, namely, may
a n applicant receive temporary total disability compensation while
incarcerated. A careful review of the Utah Workers Compensation
Act indicate that the Act is silent on this particular issue.
Further, there is no reported Utah case law on the issue.
The applicant herein, Mark King, sustained a compensable
industrial accident on November 20, 1989, when he fell off a roof
while during the course and scope of his employment. The applicant
was paid temporary total disability benefits at the rate of $183.00
per week commencing effective November 21, 1989 through July 13,
1990
The applicant was scheduled for wrist surgery on May 30,
1990.
Unfortunately, on May 22, 1990, the applicant was
incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Jail.
The defendants
terminated temporary total compensation benefits as of July l 3f
1990. The applicant apparently was admitted for his surgery on
January 29, 1991, and the surgery itself was performed on January
30, 1991. It would appear from the fi 1 e then, that the applicant
w as incarcerated for the period May 22, 1990 through January 28,
1991.
The applicant, by and through counsel, has taken the position
that "Compensation benefits are a property right and an insurance
benefit." By contrast, the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, by
and through counsel, indicates that
"Claimant's loss of wages
while incarcerated was not the result of his disability, but of his
acts resulting in his incarceration. He effectively removed

MARK KING
ORDER
PAGE TWO
himself from the labor market by his incarceration."
Considering
the novel nature of the question, and considering the purpose of
the Workers Compensation Act, I conclude that the position of the
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah appears to be the more rational
and reasonable position.
The applicant, by and through his
voluntary act of being incarcerated, should not be allowed by that
act to postpone definitive surgical treatment indefinitely, and
receive compensation benefits for his voluntary act which resulted
in the delay of receiving definitive treatment. In other words,
once definitive treatment has been recommended for an applicant, if
the applicant because of some voluntary act, or some voluntary
decision, decides that surgery will not be received at that time,
then it is not fair nor reasonable to expect the workers
compensation carrier to pay the applicant temporary total
compensation benefits during the entire period of time that the
applicant is either deciding to have the treatment, or has
voluntarily made himself unavailable for the treatment. To require
such a result, clearly abuses the nature and purpose of the workers
compensation system. The workers compensation system is for the
purpose of compensating lost wages, resulting from disability due
to the industrial accident. However, in this case, the applicant's
loss of wages for the period May 22, 1990 through January 28, 1991,
is not directly related to the industrial accident whatsoever.
Rather, the applicant's loss of wages for that period of time was
solely due to his actions or conduct resulting in his being
incarcerated for that period of time.
Put differently, to allow the applicant to receive temporary
total disability while he was incarcerated, would in effect be
saying that applicants, for whatever reason, may prolong the
receipt of definitive surgical treatment, for whatever reason, and
the carrier will be required to pay benefits during that prolonged
period.
Such a result is clearly not mandated by the Workers
Compensation Act, nor by common sense or reason. Therefore, for
the period while the applicant was incarcerated, he is not entitled
to temporary total compensation benefits.
However, once the
applicant was released from jail and presented himself for medical
treatment on January 29, 1991, his entitlement to temporary total
compensation benefits commenced anew.
ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for
temporary total compensation benefits during the period May 22,
1990 through January 28, 1991, should be, and the same is hereby
dismissed with prejudice.

MARK KING
ORDER
PAGE THTIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Workers Compensation Fund shall
be entitled to a credit for any temporary total compensation paid
to the applicant after May 22, 1990, and before January 29, 1991,
as against their liability for temporary total compensation for the'
period after January 28 1991,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of
date hereof, specifying In detail the particular errors
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and
subject to review or appeal,

the
the
and
not

1M2L

Timoti^y^CTyAllen
Administrative Law Judge

Passed b\ the industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
,(..' -\'

u

ATTEST:
^

v—

.,-

_4_- ./-

Patricia 0. 'Ashby JCommission Secretary
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative
Judge of June 14, 1991, is hereby remanded for further consideration.

Law

Stephen fl. Hadle^
Chairms

"

/

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

^

L
^C "7 u \u -t

Dixie L. Minson
Commissioner

Certified this

/^6£J

ATI EST:
)
Patricia 0. Ashby
Commission Secretary

!
day of•J^Qptamby
Gcptambtr 1991,

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 0<
Case No. 91000307
•••'••' " w "

icAl

# "

MARK KING,

, .^*

^ ^

Appl leant
)RI)I«"K

IILON

REMAND

vs.
SUPERIOR ROOFING and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH,
Hi- ( endants.
* * * * * * *

*

!

j u iy gr i99i# the Administrative Law Judge entered an Order
in this matter finding that the applicant was not entitled to
temporary total compensation for the period of his incarceration in
what was presumed to be the Salt Lake County Jail.
The
Administrative Law Judge found that the applicant was incarcerated
for the period May 22, 1990 through January 28, 1991• Subsequent
to the issuance of that Order, the applicant caused an Affidavit to
be filed with the Commission indicating that he, in fac4-. va:3
released from the Utah State Prison on October 13, 199 0.
ine
applicant, by and through counsel, takes the position that he is
entitled to temporary total disability benefits for the entire
period of his incarceration of May 22, 1990 through October
1990, and that, in, addition., the claimant is also entitled
n
temporary total compensation for the period October 14, T
he actually received surgery on January 30, 1991.
0n

reader may recall, the applicant sustained a
As
t|le
compensable industrial injury on November 20, 1989, and was
scheduled for right wrist on surgery on May 30, 1990. However, the
applicant was returned to the Utah State Prison for a probation
violation on May 22, 1990- The Administrative Law Judge previously
found that the applicant's loss of wages for the claimed period was
not related to the industrial accident whatsoever,, but, rather, was
solely due to the actions or conduct of the applicant wnich
resulted in his bei.iv:; incarcerated. The file was remanded to the
Administrative Law Judge for consideration of the additional
evidence, which " ^an only presume was the evidence that ^ heapplicant '--.-, .: ! __•_, released from the Utah State Prison on
October 13, :>;9However, that additional evidence, if you will,
does not cnange tne underlying basis for my decision.
In other
words, put differently, I also find that the applicant misreads the
purpose of workers compensation benefits in the state of Utah. He
also h^c: f^i]oHi +-- satisfy the causatio~ requirement which i s

MARK KING
ORDER UPON REMAND
PAGE TWO
mandated in every workers compensation case. Specifically/ in this
case, the applicants industrial accident was not the ca\I5e of the
applicant's disability for the period May 22, 1990 through October
13, 1990, the period of incarceration. Rather, as a result of the
applicant's incarceration. the applicant's period of disability was
rendered greater or was permitted to continue. This period of
disability is caused by the voluntary actions of the applicant and
cannot fairly be attributed causally to the industrial accident.
This same reasoning might be said to apply to the period of
temporary total disability sought for the period October 14, 1990
through January 29, 1991. The industrial injury did not cause this
period of temporary disability, but, rather, this period of
temporary disability was also causally related to the applicant's
incarceration of May 22, 1990 through October 13, 1990. Had the
applicant not been incarcerated, he would have received the
scheduled surgery and would not have incurred a period of temporary
disability that he did. Although the applicant contends that it
was not his fault, the applicant misperceives the underlying basis
of the workers compensation system.
The workers compensation
system is not a fault system but, rather, is a system which is
characterized by causation, both legal and medical causation.
Therefore, the fault or absence of fault of a party is irrelevant.
Rather, the more probative inquiry must necessarily focus on
whether or not there is a causal connection between the injury and
the benefits claimed. In this case, there is no causal connection,
because the incarceration caused the period of temporary total
disability and caused it to be rendered greater and allowed or
permitted it to continue far beyond its normal duration.
To reiterate, I find there is no causal connection between the
claimed period of disability and the industrial accident. Rather,
I find that the applicant's claimed period of disability is
causally related to his incarceration and not the industrial
accident. I hereby also adopt my prior opinion in this matter and
the same is hereby incorporated by reference as if set forth fully
hereinabove.
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for
additional temporary total compensation is hereby, dismissed with
prejudice.

MARK KING
ORDER UPON REMAND
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11 IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final arvH not.
subject to review or appeal.

Certified by the Industrial Commissum
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, I In

/**
^

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
Mark King,

-

VS.

*
*

Superior Roofing Co.,
and Workers Compensation Fund
of Utah,
Respondent.

*
*
*
*

^

<**
£*, ~s.
v\
<t „ iA V $
%$>

*
Applicant,

^

DENIAL OF MOTION
FOR REVIEW

%>

%\s
' ^
^

Case No. 91000307

<$-40W|-K*i

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
The applicant asks that we review his Motion for Review of the
administrative law judge's (ALJ) Order Upon Remand issued March 23,
1992. We had remanded this case to the ALJ because the applicant
had submitted an affidavit to the Commission subsequent to the
issuance of the ALJ's original order in this case, and the ALJ had
not seen this affidavit.
The applicant asserts that he is entitled to temporary total
compensation (TTC) benefits for the entire period of his
incarceration from May 22, 1990 through October 13, 1990, as well
as TTC for the period October 14, 1990 until the date of surgery on
January 30, 1991.
The applicant had incurred an industrial injury on November
20, 1989, and surgery was scheduled for his right wrist on May 30,
1990. Because of a probation violation, the applicant was returned
to the Utah State Prison on May 22, 1990. He was apparently
released on October 13, 1990. As a result it appears that the
applicant's surgery was rescheduled to January 30, 1991.
The ALJ found in his Order Upon Remand that the applicant's
industrial accident was not the cause of the disability for the
period May 22, 1990 through October 13, 1990, the period of
incarceration. The ALJ's order reads in pertinent part:
...[A]s a result of the applicant's incarceration,
the applicant's period of disability was rendered
greater or was permitted to continue. This period
of disability is caused by the voluntary actions
of the applicant and cannot fairly be attributed
causally to the industrial accident.
Order Upon Remand, at 2.
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The ALJ also concluded that the same logic applied to the
period October 14, 1990 through January 29, 1991. The ALJ states,
"Had the applicant not been incarcerated, he would have received
the scheduled surgery, and would not have incurred a period of
temporary disability that he did." Id.
The applicant has received the amount of temporary total
disability that he would have received had he not been
incarcerated.
The applicant desires his employer or insurance
carrier to extend that period by seven months for a period of
incarceration over which they had no control. We conclude that a
period of incarceration under the facts of this case do not extend
the period for which employers or insurance carriers are
responsible.
The applicant also complains that he has not been accorded a
fair and full hearing. Again, we conclude that this allegation is
without merit since there is no dispute of the facts, only the
legal significance of them. The ALJ assumed all the material and
relevant facts asserted by the applicant to be true. Although the
applicant alleges that the ALJ improperly determined that his
incarceration was due to the applicant's misconduct, we find that
the applicant's admission in his affidavit of August 16, 1991 that
he was in the Utah State Prison until October 13, 1990 was
sufficient evidence on which the ALJ could conclude that the
applicant was incarcerated.
We can take judicial notice of the fact that people who are
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison are there due to their
misconduct, and that this fact is common knowledge in the
community. Cf. Utah Fuel Co. v. Ind. Comm'n. 67 Utah 25, 245 P.
381, 45 A.L.R. 882 (1926). Since people who are incarcerated in
the Utah State Prison are there due to misconduct, we conclude that
the ALJ's findings are not erroneous especially since the applicant
has provided us no information in his Motion for Review or in his
affidavit of August 16, 1991 which would allow us to conclude
differently.
For all the above reasons, the Order Upon Remand of the ALJ is
based upon substantial evidence in light of our review of the
entire record, and we must therefore affirm.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the Order Upon Remand of the administrative
law judge issued on March 23, 1991 is affirmed.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b16.
The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes.

Sl^p^en M. Hadley
Chairman
^

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

Jblleen S. Coltbn
Commissioner
Certified this^W^Vday of f\Aj^,
ATTEST:
Patricia O. Ashby
Commission Secx^ta^y
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35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of
payments — State average weekly
wage defined.
tl) In case of temporary disability, the employee
*hall receive 662/3% of that employee's average
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such
disability is total, but not more than a maximum of
lOCFc of the state average weekly wage at the time of
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of
$45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5
for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up
to a maximum of four such dependent children, not to
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at
the time of the injury, but not to exceed 100% of the
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury
per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a
period of eight years from the date of the injury.
In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of
recovery, and when no such light duty employment is
available to the employee from the employer, temporary disability benefits shall continue to be paid.
(2) The ffstate average weekly wage" as referred to
in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be determined
by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of
each year, the total wages reported on contribution
reports to the department of employment security under the commission for the preceding calendar year
shall be divided by the average monthly number of
insured workers determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the preceding year by
twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall
be divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus
determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state
average weekly wage as so determined shall be used
as the basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease which occurred during the twelvemonth period commencing July 1 following the June
1 determination, and any death resulting therefrom.

